We use Entertainment and Travel Costs (ETC) from Chinese …rms to analyze the composition of ETC and its e¤ect on …rm performance. We identify components of ETC by examining how the total ETC responds to di¤erent institutional environmental variables. We …nd strong evidence that …rms' ETC consists of a mix that includes bribery to government o¢ cials both as "grease money"and "protection money,"and managerial excesses. ETC overall has a significantly negative e¤ect on …rm productivity, but the negative e¤ect is less pronounced for …rms operating under weaker institutions. 
Introduction
Corruption is one of the central issues in developing and transitional economies. Indeed, the Copenhagen Consensus identi…ed "Governance and Corruption" as one of the global priority proposals (see Rose-Ackerman 2004) . At least two crucial conditions need to be met in order to e¤ectively curb corruption: …rst, we must have e¤ective methods to detect corruption; second and probably more importantly, we must know the institutional determinants of corruption. Yet due to its illicit nature corruption is notoriously di¢ cult to detect with objective data. As a result, most of the existing literature on corruption relies either on micro-level subjective surveys or country- While …nding reliable and objective, albeit indirect, evidence of corruption is important, from a public policy viewpoint it is equally critical to understand the institutional causes and economic consequences of corruption. Of course, corruption results from weak institutions; but, as argued in Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) , not all weak institutions are alike. They proposed a dichotomy of "property rights"and "contracting institutions"and argued that weakness of the two sets of institutions leads to di¤erent responses from economic parties and implies di¤erent social consequences. 1 Due to data limitations, empirical work has shed little light on the more detailed institutional causes of corruption. Moreover, most of the existing empirical research on the e¤ect of corruption typically focus on whether corrupt governments lower the rates of economic growth at the macro level (see, for example, Mauro 1995); and there is no systematic evidence regarding the private return to bribing government o¢ cials at the …rm level. 2 Our paper makes four contributions to the vast literature on corruption. First, we rely on the predictions from a simple model of Chinese managers'behavior and use indirect inference approach to detect corruption. Second, we empirically investigate various institutional determinants in …rms' bribery decisions. Third, we examine how the private returns to …rms from corruptive activities vary with institutional factors. Finally, our …ndings suggest an alternative proxy for corruption measure in China and possibly other countries. This data e¤ort could prove fruitful for future research given the notorious di¢ culties in collecting data on corruption. 3 Using a unique data set of around 15,000 Chinese …rms, we investigate "Entertainment and Travel Costs"(henceforth, ETC), a standard expenditure item in the accounting books of Chinese …rms. The information about ETC in our data set is directly taken from …rms'accounting books and thus is not subject to the biases associated with subjective survey data. As its name indicates, it is used to cover entertainment (including eating, drinking, gifts, Karaoke and sports club membership, etc.) and travel expenditures. 4 Besides legitimate business travel and other expenses, Chinese 1 "Property right institutions" are weak when …rms are subject to expropriation by government o¢ cials or other individuals. Firms as a result may be forced to pay bribes in exchange for protection (or less expropriation). Corruption in such cases does not play a socially productive role. In contrast, "contracting institutions" are weak when governments do not provide high-quality services to facilitate trade, such as slow license approvals or erratic contract enforcement. Firms will be induced to bribe government o¢ cials to "greases the wheel." Corruption under such circumstances can increase social welfare by "making things work" in an otherwise rigid and sti ‡ing bureaucratic system (see, for example, Lui 1985 for a formal argument, and Kaufmann and Wei 1998 for an empirical inquiry). 2 Fisman and Svensson (2002) is the only paper we are aware of that examines how bribery a¤ects …rm growth using …rm-level data from Uganda. They rely on self-reported bribery payments in their analysis and …nd a strong negative e¤ect of bribery payments on …rm growth. 3 Cull and Xu (2005), for instance, used self-reported bribes of …rms as a measure of corruption. Contrary to popular beliefs, this measure is zero for the vast majority of …rms; not surprisingly with this poor proxy, they do not …nd signi…cant e¤ects of corruption on …rms'reinvestment decisions, due to the large amount of measurement errors. 4 See Washington Post (August 22, 2005 ) for a report on how such practices a¤ected U.S. multinationals operating managers commonly use the ETC accounting category to reimburse expenditures used to bribe government o¢ cials, to entertain clients and suppliers, or simply as managerial excess. 5 Fake or in ‡ated receipts are submitted for reimbursement of illegitimate expenses. While the central government is aware of such practices, to prove that a particular expenditure is illegitimate is close to impossible, because in China it is still the norm to do business transactions in cash, thus such practices are de facto legal. 6 On average each …rm in our data sets spends 1740,000 Chinese Yuan (more than $210,000) annually on ETC. The average ETC expenditures is about 1.5 percent of its total sales revenues and about 3 percent of its total value-added. In contrast, ETC expenditure is about 0.74 percent of their total sales in 2000-03 among all listed manufacturing …rms in Korea. 7 Thus as a percentage of total sales, Chinese …rms in our sample spend about twice as much ETC as Korean manufacturing …rms.
To infer from the total ETC expenditure about its components, the key empirical challenge is that ETC likely contains both legitimate business expenses and corruptive expenses. Similar to the indirect inference approach of Duggan and Levitt (2002), we develop a simple model of Chinese manager's decisions over how much to spend on three di¤erent categories of expenditures: (1) normal business expenditures (to build relationship capital with suppliers and clients); (2) corruption payments to government o¢ cials in exchange for lower expropriation and/or better service; (3) managerial excesses (e.g., taking family and friends to restaurants, clubs and travels at the …rms' expense). The predictions from our model indicate that, ceteris paribus, if the expropriation by local government (proxied by e¤ective tax rates) is responsive to bribery payments, total ETC will be higher for …rms more prone to expropriation; similarly, if the quality of local government service is responsive to bribery payments, …rms will bribe more in cities with lower quality of government service. We also derive similar comparative statics predictions about how the total ETC is affected by …rms'relational capital with clients and suppliers and by …rms'governance structure. We use these comparative statics predictions to identify components of ETC by examining how ETC responds to di¤erent environmental variables constructed in our data set.
in China. 5 Such practice is not limited to China. Bodrock (2005) documented similar cases in Ukraine. 6 Some common business practices also implicitly encourage corruption. For example, many hotels operate boutiques for expensive gifts, and those gifts can be invoiced as room charges, and this would be classi…ed as traveling costs under ETC. 7 We thank Keun Lee who calculated this number from Korea Investors Services database.
We …nd that ETC is higher when government expropriation is more severe, and when the quality of government service is lower. From the theoretical predictions of the model, these …ndings suggest that corrupt payments to government o¢ cials account for a signi…cant portion of ETC. Moreover, they also suggest that …rms pay bribes both to buy "protection"against government expropriation and to "grease the wheel" in buying government services.
These …ndings are further reinforced in our analysis of the e¤ects of ETC on …rm performance as measured by TFP and labor productivity. Overall, we …nd that ETC negatively a¤ects …rms'total factor productivity (TFP) and labor productivity, a result that is robust when we include di¤erent sets of controls, when we instrument a …rm's ETC, and with various sub-samples. This result in itself suggests that a big part of ETC is managerial excesses. This conclusion is corroborated by our …nding that the negative e¤ects of ETC on …rm performance are less pronounced in private …rms than in state-owned …rms.
More importantly, we …nd that the negative e¤ect of ETC on …rms' productivity is signi…-cantly less pronounced for …rms with higher tax burdens and for …rms receiving poorer quality of local government service. These results are exactly what our model predicts. These …ndings strongly suggest that components of ETC are spent as "protection money" to reduce government expropriation and "grease money" in exchange for better government service.
Our …ndings also suggest that some portion of ETC might also be used productively to build relational capital with suppliers and clients. Not surprisingly, we …nd that …rms that sell their main products to other provinces spend more on ETC than those who do not, suggesting that ETC increase in the di¢ culties of maintaining long-distance relationships. 8 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 , we present a simple model to illustrate our identi…cation strategy. Section 3 describes our data and presents descriptive statistics.
In Section 4, we examine the determinants of total ETC expenditures. Section 5 investigates how ETC expenditures a¤ect …rm performance; and Section 6 concludes.
A Theoretical Model and Identi…cation Strategy
In this section we propose a simple model of ETC spending by Chinese managers. The predictions from the model are the key to our empirical strategy to distinguish di¤erent components of ETC. The main idea of our approach is that if ETC is used by managers as a means of bribing gov- 8 However, some of this e¤ect could arise because …rms doing business in other provinces may have to pay additional bribes to government o¢ cials in those provinces. ernment o¢ cials besides its normal business uses, then ETC should be correlated with institutional environment variables in a certain way. From the perspective of an optimal spending decision by a typical manager, our model derives speci…c implications of how ETC should respond to institutional environment variables, thus leading to testable empirical hypotheses for whether ETC is indeed used as bribery to corruptive government o¢ cials.
Consider a manager who decides the amount of …rm funds to spend in three categories:
Normal business expenditures, denoted by x r ; to build relational capital with suppliers and clients. This, among other things, includes travel expenses to meet suppliers and clients.
Managerial excess, denoted by x c , that goes directly to the manager's own pocket or to his/her family and friends.
Corruption payments (bribes) to government o¢ cials, denoted by x b : We further divide x b into two sub-components: bribes in exchange for government services ("grease money") denoted by x g , and bribes in exchange for lower government expropriation ("protection money") denoted by x p . We can also think of x g as bribes to service-related government agencies such as licensing and utilities and x p as bribes to tax agencies. Of course x b x g + x p .
For simplicity, we assume that the …rm's performance is given by
where K g is the actual quality of service a …rm receives from the government, K r is the …rm's actual relational capital with its suppliers and clients, K p is the actual governmental expropriation the …rm faces, and a 0 and the 's ( g ; r ; p ) are non-negative parameters. Thus, the …rm's performance improves if it gets better quality government services, or has better relationships with its suppliers and clients, or faces less government expropriation.
In the above speci…cation, we abstract away the conventional production factors (capital and labor) whose contributions to …rm pro…t are summarized in the parameter a 0 , in order to focus on the variables of central interest to us. To have the simplest model possible, we also abstract away from any interaction between these variables by using an additive speci…c functional form to derive closed form solutions. In an earlier working paper version (Cai, We assume that K g , K r and K p are given as follows: 9
where K 0 g is the baseline quality of service from the government with no additional "grease money" bribes; K 0 r is the baseline level of the …rm's relational capital with its suppliers and clients without any additional relational investment; K 0 p is the baseline government expropriation in the absence of any additional "protection money" bribes; and a g , a r and a p are non-negative parameters. The interpretation of these equations is as follows. Take Equation (2) as an example. The actual quality of government service the …rm receives depends on two parts: (a) the baseline quality K 0 g that re ‡ects the general attitude of the government towards business and the existing relationship of the particular …rm with the government; and (b) the "grease money" bribery the …rm invests in exchange for better government services. The parameter a g measures the e¤ectiveness of the "grease money" bribes to government o¢ cials x g in increasing K g . Thus, K 0 g is the existing stock of the …rm's relational capital with the government, while a g x g is the additional relational capital accumulated as a result of the …rm's investment of x g . The manager's problem is to choose x c ; x r ; x g ; x p to maximize:
where the …rst term c ln(x c ) is the manager's utility from self-consumption, and the second term represents how much his incentives are aligned with maximizing the …rm's performance. The parameter c measures how much the manager values self-consumption through ETC, and the parameter measures the congruity of managerial incentives with the …rm owners' incentives.
Note that this formulation of managerial incentives allows multiple (and not necessarily exclusive)
interpretations. The most direct interpretation is that is the manager's incentives from his compensation contract (i.e., through bonus or share-holding). Another interpretation is that the 9 We make an important linearity assumption in the "production equation which again can be approximated by . In the latter two interpretations, is higher if the …rm has better governance structure and the managerial market is well functioning.
It is easy to solve for the manager's optimal expenditure decisions:
In our data we only observe the total amount of ETC spent by …rms, that is, ET C = x g +x r +x p +x c , and some proxies for K 0 g , K 0 r , K 0 p and which will be described below. To test the model, we thus rely on the comparative statics results of the model. Speci…cally, we have the following implications.
Implication 1 If ETC is spent as "grease money" (x g > 0), then it should be decreasing in the baseline level of government service K 0 g ; otherwise, ETC should not be correlated with K 0 g in any statistically signi…cant way.
The intuition behind this result/implication is simple. If the quality of government services is not su¢ ciently responsive to bribery payments (i.e., low a g ), …rms will not bribe at all for better government services. In this case, ETC will be unrelated with the baseline government services.
When the quality of government services is su¢ ciently responsive to bribery payments (i.e., high a g ), then …rms will invest via ETC to obtain better government services. From the standard assumption of a concave production function, the marginal return of the "grease money" bribery is decreasing in the baseline government service quality which is the existing stock of the …rm's relational capital with the government. So a higher baseline government service quality means that the …rm needs to spend less money to ensure getting high quality government services. Therefore, whenever the …rm does spend "grease" money in buying government services, ETC will decrease in the baseline government service quality.
Implication 2 If ETC is spent in building business relationships (x r > 0), then it should be decreasing in the baseline level of relational capital with suppliers and clients K 0 r ; otherwise, ETC should not be correlated with K 0 r in any statistically signi…cant way.
The intuition of Implication 2 is exactly the same as that of Implication 1.
Implication 3
If ETC is spent as "protection money" (x p > 0), then it should be increasing in the baseline level of government expropriation K 0 p ; otherwise, ETC should not be correlated with K 0 p in any statistically signi…cant way.
The intuition of Implication 3 is similar to those of the previous two results, except that ETC is increasing instead of decreasing in the baseline level of government expropriation K 0 p when the manager spends ETC as protection money. This is because the …rm's investment x p is to reduce K 0 p , thus the usual concavity assumption implies that the greater K 0 p , the greater the marginal return of x p , hence the more ETC spent as "protection money." Implication 4 If ETC is spent as managerial excess (x c > 0), then it should be decreasing in the congruity of managerial incentives ; otherwise, ETC should not be correlated with in any statistically signi…cant way.
This result is easy to understand. That managerial excess is decreasing in the congruity of managerial incentives follows from any standard model of managerial incentives. As managerial self-interests are prevalent and no corporate structure is perfect, managerial excess is present in one form or another. In our context, we focus on a speci…c form of managerial excess, that is, in the form of Entertainment and Travel Costs. Our prior is that a portion of ETC is used by the manager for self-enjoyment. The question is whether it is statistically signi…cant in our data and what the magnitude and the e¤ect are.
How does ETC a¤ect …rm performance? From Equation (1), the possible components of ETC, x g , x r and x p , are all investments of various kinds. Since the manager chooses these investment levels to maximize …rm performance [see Equation (5) ], at the optimum …rm performance will be higher whenever the optimal investment levels are positive than when they are zero. Thus, this implies that the …rm's performance will be positively correlated with ETC. On the other hand, the managerial excess component of ETC, x c , is totally unproductive to …rm performance, which leads to a negative correlation between …rm performance and ETC. Therefore, on the net whether ETC and …rm performance are positively or negatively correlated is theoretically ambiguous and remains to be seen empirically.
Despite this ambiguity, we still can gain useful information in identifying components of ETC from examining the correlation between ETC and …rm performance. Note that ETC is endogenously chosen by the manager and can only change if one of its components changes with some change in parameter values. So what is the marginal return of ETC on …rm performance, that is, how much …rm performance would change for one unit of change in ETC? To answer this question, one needs to know what parameter change causes the one unit change in ETC. Take the "grease money" component x g as an example. Suppose x g = 0, i.e., ETC is not spent as "grease money" at all.
Then ETC is independent of K 0 g , g and a g , hence one unit change of ETC cannot be caused by and change in these parameters. Thus, the marginal return of ETC to …rm performance would not be correlated with K 0 g . Now suppose ETC is spent as "grease money," i.e., x g > 0. Consider some change of parameter values in K 0 g , g and a g that leads to one unit change in x g , and hence one unit change in ETC (holding other parameters constant). By the Envelope Theorem, we can show the following: 10 Implication 5 If ETC is spent as "grease money" (x g > 0), then its marginal return to …rm performance should be decreasing in the baseline level of government service K 0 g ; otherwise, it should not be correlated with K 0 g in any statistically signi…cant way.
The intuition for this result is clear. When the baseline level of government service is lower, "grease money" spent in ETC will be more e¤ective and thus have greater marginal contributions to …rm performance. Similarly we have Implication 6 If ETC is spent as "protection money" (x p > 0), then its marginal return to …rm performance should be increasing in the baseline level of government expropriation K 0 p ; otherwise, it should not be correlated with K 0 p in any statistically signi…cant way.
The above six implications from our model together form our identi…cation strategy, and we shall take them to our data below. Before doing that, there is one caveat. In our model we focus on the manager's single-period decision problem. Presumably dynamic considerations are pertinent when parts of ETC expenditures are equivalent to investments in long-term relationships with government o¢ cials, suppliers and clients. This modeling assumption is partly for simplicity and partly out of necessity because we only have one-period information on Entertainment and Travel
Costs for the …rms in our data. Thus, even though the model talks about a representative …rm, our empirical exercise relies on variations across …rms to test the implications of the model.
). By the Envelope Theorem, it can be shown that at the optimum d =dK
which is clearly increasing in K are unique to the Liaoning data set (the second survey), so in total there are 128 cities in the three surveys. Since the …rst and the last surveys were designed to be representative geographically, the data set covers representative regions and cities in China. In fact, the 120 cities in the last survey covers 70 to 80 percent of Chinese GDP. 11 In the …rst survey, either 100 or 150 …rms were randomly sampled for each city from an electronic database of …rms subject to the following constraints. First, …rms were selected to ensure that both manufacturing and service industry …rms were adequately represented. 12 Second, only …rms above a certain minimum size requirement (20 in manufacturing industries and 15 in service industries) were sampled. 13 The second survey covered all major cities in Liaoning Province. 80 …rms were sampled in the cities of Shenyang and Dalian, the two largest cities in the province, and 70 …rms were sampled in all other 13 cities. 14 The third survey covers 120 cities in all Chinese provinces except Tibet. For each province, the provincial capital (most often also the most populous city) was automatically covered, and optionally additional cities were selected based on the economic size of a province (as measured by GDP and industrial output). 100 …rms were sampled in each city except the 4 mega cities (Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing, and Chongqing) for which 200 …rms were selected. 15 The three surveys cover a combined total of 15,870 …rms located in 128 cities that are at very di¤erent stages of economic development. Within this sample of cities, GDP per capita (in 2002 value) ranges from 3600 Yuan in Chaoyang to 72,000 Yuan in Dongguan (equivalently to about $430 to $8,700).
The questionnaires for the three surveys are identical for the variables we use in our analysis and they consist of two parts. 16 The …rst part is …lled out by …rms'senior managers and asks for qualitative information about the …rm; the second part covers …nancial and quantitative information about the …rms'production and operation, and is obtained from personal interviews with the …rm's chief accountant or personnel manager. Our data sets thus contain detailed information about …rm characteristics and performance. The average (median) …rm in our sample has 866 (215) employees, and has been in business for 14 (9) years. Its annual total sales revenue is about 419 (37.0) million yuan. While the average …rm makes a pro…t equal to approximately 1.1 percent of its total sales, the median …rm makes a pro…t of 1.6 percent of its total sales. Close to three quarters of the …rms in our sample sell their main products to other provinces. The average share of private ownership is 38%, and foreign ownership is 12%.
Measurement of Key Variables
Measurement of ETC. The variable of central interest is Entertainment and Travel Costs. This is a readily available category in the accounting book of every …rm and is obtained from the second part of the surveys with the …rm's chief accountant. As a part of management expenses ("guan li fei yong" in Chinese), these expenditures are measured with little error because each reimbursement item in this category needs a "receipt." Entertainment and Travel Costs are supposedly for the purpose of reimbursing expenses related to conducting normal businesses. However, accounting practice in China is su¢ ciently lax so that managers may get reimbursed for almost any kind of entertainment and travel for any purpose, often with fake or in ‡ated receipts.
Entertainment and Travel Costs represent a signi…cant portion of …rms' expenditures. The ratio of these costs to value-added has a median of 1.4 percent and a mean of 3.0 percent. In our empirical analysis, we normalize Entertainment and Travel Costs by Total Sales, and from now on the term ETC refers to the Entertainment and Travel Costs/Total Sales ratio. In our data, ETC 1 5 The minimum number of employees for …rms in the sample is 10. Only manufacturing industries were sampled.
Firms were …rst divided into large, medium and small, each accounting for about 1/3 of total sales in an industry. Then 1/3 of the required sample was drawn randomly from each size category. 1 6 The survey instrument is available from the authors upon request. has a median of 0.6 percent, and a mean of 1.5 percent. 17 ETC also varies substantially across …rms, with a sample standard deviation of 3.8 percent.
[ Figure 1 About Here] Across cities, the …rm average of ETC ranges from 0.3 percent in Dongguan, a coastal and the richest city in our sample, to 3.8 percent in Guiyang, an inland and relatively backward city. Figure   1 plots the city averages of ETC and logged GDP per capita, and the lowess-smoothed line (i.e., the …tted value of locally weighted regression of ETC on the other variable). It shows a clear negative relationship between the average ETC (ETC averaged over …rms in the city) and the logarithm of the city's per capita GDP.
Measurement of K 0 g : Our identi…cation strategy presented in Section 2 relies on the relationship between ETC and key environment variables K 0 g ; K 0 p and K 0 r : We now describe how these variables are proxied in our empirical analysis. Recall that K 0 g is meant to capture the baseline quality of government service in the absence of additional bribes. We proxy K 0 g for each …rm in our data by the manager's answer to the following question: "Among the government o¢ cials that your …rm regularly interacts with, what is the percentage that tends to help the …rm develop?" The answer to this question re ‡ects the …rm's evaluation of the tendency of government o¢ cials to help them; hence we will hereafter call this variable "Government Help.""Government Help"is a …rm-speci…c measure of government helpfulness that depends on the overall government quality and the lagged relational capital each …rm has with government o¢ cials. To avoid endogeneity, we use the median of the city-industry cell of "Government Help" as the measure of the baseline level of government services. We allow the baseline K 0 g to di¤er by city-industry cells because there are vast regional variations in both development level and governance, and the need for government services tend to di¤er by industry. Since we also control for province (or other regional) dummies and industry dummies, this city-industry tendency for "government help" is unlikely to be correlated with the error term at the …rm level. For the rest of the paper, "Government Help" would refer to the city-industry median of …rm-level observations of "Government Help."
[ Figure 2 About Here]
The left panel of Figure 2 graphs average ETC against "Government Help" for all cities in our data. Note that by construction the average "Government Help"in a city is bounded between zero and one, and it di¤ers greatly across the cities with a mean of .32 and a standard deviation of .28.
The graph clearly shows that …rms tend to spend less on ETC in cities in which the government is perceived to be more helpful, suggesting that ETC may be used to buy better government services.
Measurement of K 0 p : Recall that K 0 p is the baseline government expropriation in the absence of any additional bribe to the government o¢ cials. For each …rm we proxy K 0 p by its "Total Tax Burden in the Previous Year," as measured by total taxes divided by total sales in the previous year. This variable is taken from surveys with …rm accountants. There is a substantial amount of across-…rm variation in tax burdens. Tax rates di¤er across …rm types (e.g., tax incentives to attract foreign investments) and across regions (e.g., negotiations between the central government and provinces, tax reductions for special economic zones). Moreover, tax law enforcement and collection e¤orts di¤er greatly across cities and across …rms within each city, so a …rm's actual tax burden depends on the vigilance level of local tax o¢ cials and the …rm's relationship with them.
Again, to avoid endogeneity, we measure tax burden by the city-industry median and control for regional and industry dummies in the regression. For the rest of the paper, tax burden refers to the city-industry median of this one-year lagged …rm-level tax burden measure. The sample average of tax burden is 4.1 percent of sales, with a standard deviation of 1.9 percentage point. The 10 percentile in tax burden is 1.7 percent, and the 90th percentile is 6.5 percent. The right panel of Figure 2 plots average ETC against the tax burden at the city level. The graph shows a strikingly strong positive relationship, suggesting that ETC may be used to cushion the blunt of government expropriations.
Measurement of K 0
r : To measure a …rm's baseline relational capital with its suppliers and clients K 0 r , we construct a variable called "Years of Relationship," which is the sum of the years that the …rm has known its most important supplier and the years that it has known its most important client. 18 This variable shows substantial variation across cities, with a low of 8 years in Chaoyang on average to a high of 15 years on average in Tianjin. The sample mean is 11.8 years, and the sample standard deviation is 5.7 years. Implication 2 indicates that if managers use entertainment expenditures to build contracting relationships with their suppliers and clients, ETC should be negatively correlated with "Years of relationship." The right panel of Figure 3 plots ETC against the logarithm of "Years of Relationship."The slope is negative, suggesting that part of ETC might 1 8 The two components of this variables are closely correlated, and including both of them would lead to multicollinearity. We thus bundle them together as a single variable. be used to build relationship with trading partners.
[ Figure 3 About Here]
Other Variables. In our theoretical framework, the corporate governance/managerial incentive parameter a¤ects the manager's ETC expenditure. However the incentive structure for managers in Chinese …rms is not at all transparent, and no good data are available on managerial incentives.
We use Private Ownership, both domestic and foreign, to gauge how a manager's incentives are aligned with those of the …rm. Private owners are more motivated by pro…ts and are thus likely to have stronger incentives to monitor managers' behavior. In our sample, the share of private ownership varies across …rms from 0 (purely state-owned) to 1 (purely private), and the average …rm in our sample has 38 percent of private ownership, with a standard deviation of 45 percent. The city averages of domestic private ownership vary from 78 percent in Wenzhou, a coastal city known for its private enterprises, to less than 2 percent in Dongguan; the city average of foreign ownership varies from 0 percent in Wuzhong and Tieling to 81% in Dongguan. Figure 4 plots average ETC against private ownership at the city level, revealing a weak relationship between ETC and domestic private ownership, and a negative relationship between ETC and foreign ownership.
[ Figure 4 About Here]
Besides ownership, we also include in our empirical analysis basic …rm characteristics such as the number of employees, …rm age, and whether the …rm sells to other provinces. Whether selling to other provinces also partly captures normal business expenditure since more cross-provincial traveling implies higher traveling costs. We capture regional characteristics by including city-level GDP per capita (in 2002 value) and dummies of regions (alternatively regional dummies, provincial dummies, and city dummies). 19 Although all three surveys were implemented by the same survey team from the China National Bureau of Statistics along with the World Bank, we use the two dummies indicating the later two surveys to control for variations in enumerator quality and survey implementation. The data dummies also function as control for macro trend since the data dummies and year dummies are perfectly collinear. Table 1 lists the detailed de…nition of each variable and its mean and standard deviation.
[ Table 1 About Here] Table 2 shows the correlation of ETC with some key variables. Overall we can see that ETC is lower for …rms that are more e¢ cient, are larger, are located in richer cities, have more foreign ownership shares, have stronger trading relationships, and pay their CEOs higher salaries. Moreover, ETC is lower in economic environments with better government services and lower tax burden. 20 [ Table 2 about Here]
Composition of ETC
In this section, we empirically examine the determinants of ETC, using regression speci…cations suggested by our simple model in Section 2. The dependent variable is ETC, and the list of explanatory variables varies by speci…cation. For each regression speci…cation we only use the sample of …rms for which there is no missing value for any of the explanatory variables. For each …rm, we use the data from the last year in the respective survey because the Entertainment and Travel Cost is observed only for that year. The speci…cation we estimate is:
where the subscripts ijc stand for …rm i in industry j located in city c: We include industry dummy IN D j to …lter out industry-speci…c needs for business expenditures in ETC; X c is a citylevel variable aimed to control for various aspects related to economic development. Depending on speci…cations, X c will either be the logarithm of the per capita GDP of the city, denoted by ln (GDP _P C c ) ; or alternatively various types of dummies for locations (such as regional dummies, provincial dummies, or city dummies). The vector Z i is a list of basic …rm characteristics including 2 0 Table 2 …rm size (logarithm of the number of employees, lagged by one period), age (logarithm of 1 + …rm age), and whether it sells to other provinces. The vector X ijc includes the variables discussed in the above section: "Government Help" (proxying K 0 g ); "Total Tax Burden in the Previous Year" (proxying K 0 p ), "Years of Relationship" (proxying K 0 r ); "Private Ownership" and "Foreign Ownership"(proxing for incentives). Note that "Government Help"and "Total Tax Burden in the Previous Year" are medians of the city-industry cell, while the other three variables are …rm-level observations. 21 Table 3 presents the basic results from a series of OLS regressions of ETC on X ijc . 22 Column (1) presents the results from the simplest regression with only X ijc , controls of basic …rm characteristics and ln (GDP _P C c ). We gradually add controls in Column (2) to Column (4): in column (2) we add regional dummies, industry dummies, and survey dummies; in column (3) regional dummies is replaced with more …nely measured provincial dummies; and in column (4) we add the log of CEO compensation. In unreported speci…cations we also experimented with city dummies, and the qualitative results are similar.
[ Table 3 about Here]
From Table 3 , it is clear that the key results are quite similar across the speci…cations once we control for area, industry and survey dummies. Thus multicollinearity is not a serious issue here.
Below we shall focus on column (3) when we discuss magnitudes.
Our results show that larger …rms, as measured by the number of employees, have lower ETC.
A one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of number of employees (1.53, see Table 1) reduces ETC by about 0.5 percentage points, which is a 33 percent reduction of the ETC sample mean (1.5 percentage points). This suggests that entertainment and travel costs exhibit strong economies of scale. There is also some evidence that older …rms tend to spend more on ETC. This suggests that ETC is not a once-for-all …xed costs in establishing relationships (with either o¢ cials or trading partners).
The negative relationship between ETC and GDP per capita of the city does not survive in the regression framework. Thus the negative correlation we saw in Figure 1 and Table 2 merely picks up in ‡uence of other variables such as institutional environment and …rm characteristics.
In all speci…cation, we …nd that the proxy for K 0 g -"Government Help" -has a statistically signi…cant negative e¤ect on ETC, consistent with the raw correlation reported in Figure 2 . A one standard deviation increase in "Government Help" decreases ETC by 0.11 percentage point (or 7 percent of the mean ETC). By Implication 1, this suggests that part of ETC is spent to entertain or bribe government o¢ cials in exchange for higher quality of government services, thus providing support for the "grease money" view of corruption.
We …nd that the proxy for baseline government expropriation K 0 p , "Tax Burden in the Previous Year,"has a strong and positive e¤ect on ETC. This con…rms the positive raw correlation between lagged tax burden and ETC depicted in Figure 2 . In the speci…cation reported in Column (3), "Tax Burden in the Previous Year" is signi…cant at the 1 percent level; and a one standard deviation increase in this variable will increase ETC by 0.17 percentage points (or 11 percent of the mean ETC). From Implication 3, this evidence suggests that part of ETC is spent as "protection money" bribes to government o¢ cials in exchange for lower expropriation. 23 We …nd that the variable "Years of Relationship" proxying for baseline relational capital with its suppliers and clients K 0 r has no statistically robust relationship with ETC. Only when we do not control for regional, industry and data dummies do we …nd a statistically signi…cant negative coe¢ cient for logged years of relationship. Once we control for regional and industry dummies, this negative result largely disappears. Thus once netting out the average industry and regional ETC (which may contain normal business expenditure), we do not …nd strong support for the view that managers also use ETC to conduct normal business and to build relationships with suppliers and clients. 24 In contrast, we do …nd that …rms that sell to other provinces tend to have higher ETC.
Other things being equal, ETC in …rms that sell to other provinces is .4 percentage points higher than that in …rms that do not.
We use private and foreign ownership to proxy for corporate governance. Table 3 shows that "Private Ownership" has a negative but statistically insigni…cant e¤ect on ETC once we control 2 3 Given that we control for city level characteristics and the …rm's industry, it is reasonable that the random shocks a …rm experiences each period are serially independent. Under this assumption the lagged city-industry median of tax burden will be independent of ijc: 2 4 Some may argue that it may make more sense to separate the years of relationship with clients and those with suppliers. We have tried that, and the two variables are closely correlated, and the qualitative results are similar.
for regional and industry dummies. Foreign ownership does have a negative and more or less statistically signi…cant relationship with ETC, indicating that foreign …rms are more in line with international business norms. We have also tried replacing the continuous ownership variables with two dummy variables for domestic and foreign private ownership. Consistent with a common way to de…ne ownership, domestic private dummy is de…ned to be domestic private ownership surpassing 50 percent, and the foreign dummy as foreign ownership being positive. For the same other controls as in column (3), we …nd that the domestic private dummy is insigni…cant, while the foreign dummy is negative and signi…cant (at the 10 percent level) with a coe¢ cient of -0.14. These results thus provide some weak evidence that …rms with better governance tend to spend less on ETC.
An alternative explanation for high ETC in China is lower CEO pay. It is well-known that
Chinese …rms pay their CEOs lower than typical Western …rms. Thus it is possible that part of ETC functions as a substitute for regulated CEO pay or as an income tax-free supplement to regular CEO salary, and thus is a part of the optimal CEO incentive structure. To evaluate this hypothesis, Column (4) reports the regression results from a speci…cation in which we include logged CEO pay. 25 If the implicit CEO pay hypothesis is true, we would expect a statistically signi…cant negative relationship between logged CEO pay and ETC. The results in Column (4) support this: the logged CEO pay variable is highly statistically signi…cant and negative. Reducing logged CEO pay by one standard deviation would increase ETC by 0.18 percentage point. Of course, this result is also consistent with the interpretation that stronger managerial incentives reducing manager excess and waste. We cannot distinguish the two hypotheses. However, the other main results, in particular, those on "Government Help" and "Tax Burden in the Previous Year," remain intact after including CEO pay in the regression. Even the magnitudes do not change much, for example, the coe¢ cient of "Government Help" changes from -0.38 to -0.36.
To summarize, in light of the identi…cation strategy developed in Implications 1-4, regression results of Table 3 strongly support the view that ETC of Chinese …rms consists of multiple components. It certainly is related to normal business travel. It also includes both "grease money"
bribery to obtain better quality of government service and "protection money"bribery in exchange for lower tax burdens. Part of ETC also functions as implicit CEO pay. There is no evidence that it has a component that is related to the building of relationship capital with clients and suppliers.
ETC and Firm Performance
In this section, we examine the impact of ETC on …rm performance to shed further light on the nature of ETC. Speci…cally we test Implications 5 and 6. To do so, we estimate the following two regression equations:
where the dependent variable Y ijc is a performance measure for …rm i in industry j located in city c.
IN jc are the city-industry medians of "Government Help"and "Tax Burden in the Previous Year."
The vector of …rm level characteristics Z i is the same as in the previous section. Both regression speci…cations (9) and (10) Relationship" (for K 0 r ), and the interaction is largely insigni…cant. This is not surprising; we have found earlier that this variable is not a signi…cant predictor for ETC. Including the interaction of ETC with "Years of Relationship" also leave the other results intact.
In our empirical analysis the performance measure is productivity, primarily total factor productivity (TFP henceforth), and in sensitivity checks, labor productivity as well. 26 We trim from our sample the tail 1 percent observations of the outcome measures as outliers. We estimate TFP via the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure (TFPLP henceforth). The Levonsohn-Petrin estimator is easy to calculate and address the simultaneity issue raised by Marschak and Andrews (1944). 27 We shall also report estimates from a …rm-level …xed e¤ects speci…cation with both the CobbDouglas and the translog functional forms. The …xed-e¤ects speci…cation allows for …rm-speci…c productivity, but imposes the restriction that the …rm-speci…c productivity to be time-invariant.
The LP approach is thus less restrictive since it allows the …rm-speci…c productivity to vary over time and be correlated with input choices. However, we do note that our …ndings are robust across these and other estimators. 28 2 6 The reason we use productivity instead of pro…t as the measure of …rm performance is that …rm pro…t data obtained in …rm-level surveys in China are usually highly unreliable. Due to lax enforcement and auditing, pro…t under-reporting is widespread to evade taxes (Cai and Liu 2007). 2 7 Petrin, Levinsohn, and Poi (2004) provide Stata code for this estimator. 2 8 Other proxy methods include Olley and Pakes (1996) and the modi…ed-LP estimator suggested by Ackerberg, Caves and Fraser (2006), which uses the same invertibility condition as LP but only a subset of the moments proposed Table 4 reports the regression results of the e¤ects of ETC on TFPLP. Column (1) reports the results from the basic OLS regression with industry, survey, and regional dummies. Column (2) adds logged GDP per capita. Column (3) replaces regional dummies with more disaggregated provincial dummies, and column (4) further allows for city dummies. Columns (5) and (6) replicate columns (3) and (4), but allow for ETC interaction terms with the institutional environment variables.
OLS Regression
[ Tables 4 About Here] Overall the results are reassuringly robust across columns. The coe¢ cient estimates for most of the control variables Z i and IN cj have the expected sign. For instance, …rm productivity is higher for larger, younger, foreign-owned …rms. Firms located in cities with higher logged GDP per capita have higher productivity. Firms with stronger relationship with trading partners also have higher productivity. One surprising result is that domestic private ownership is associated negatively with productivity. 29 ETC has a strong negative e¤ect on TFP: increasing ETC by one standard deviation (. Consistent with our model, the private returns from ETC on TFP depend on the proxy variables for K 0 g and K 0 p . The negative coe¢ cient of the interaction term of ETC and "Government Help" means that if the government can provide higher quality public service, then ETC has smaller marginal contributions to …rm productivity, indicating that part of ETC is used as "grease money" to bribe for better government services. The positive coe¢ cient of the interaction term of ETC and "Tax Burden in the Previous Year"means that if a …rm faces more government expropriation, ETC has larger marginal contributions to …rm productivity, indicating that part of ETC is spent as "protection money"bribery to reduce government expropriation. These results lend strong support by LP in their estimation. For the LP method to work, it is important that the variable input is not a deterministic function of state and proxy variables (Woodridge 2005). This assumption is apparently satis…ed in our context: the regression of logged labor on logged capital and logged material yields R squares of 0.6 to 0.8 for various industries.
We shall report the results with alternative estimates of TFP later. to our hypotheses.
With both the direct and the interaction e¤ects of ETC, it is more useful to understand the e¤ects by looking at the marginal e¤ects of ETC on TFP, evaluated at the mean of the variables of IN cj : From speci…cation (10), we have @Y =@ET C = 5 + 6 IN cj : The marginal e¤ects are reported at the bottom of Columns (5) and (6) . At the mean of IN cj , the marginal e¤ect of ETC on TFP is -6.4. However, when the institutional environment is worse, the negative e¤ect of ETC becomes less pronounced: when "Government Help" (respectively, "Tax Burden in the Previous Year") decreases (increases) by one standard deviation, the marginal e¤ect of ETC becomes -4.3 (respectively, -5.0), or the magnitude drops by 1/3 (respectively, 1/5).
GMM Estimation
One issue with the OLS regression is that ETC is an endogenous variable, so if there are omitted factors that a¤ect both a …rm's ETC and its performance, the OLS estimates will be inconsistent. In the GMM speci…cations we report below, for each …rm i 0 s ETC we create the following instrument: the median ETC in …rm i 0 s city and industry cell. The choice of the instrument is justi…ed by our theoretical model. In Section 2, we showed that a …rm's "grease money"bribery x g is a function of government service quality K 0 g , and its "protection money" bribery x p is a function of K 0 p : To the extent that some components in K 0 g and K 0 p are not fully captured by their respective proxies, and …rms within the same city and industry will all have to deal with these unmeasured components (some are common for them, and some are …rm speci…c), then their expenditures x g and x p should be correlated. This suggests that the median ETC in …rm i 0 s city and industry cell is a good instrument for …rm i 0 s own ETC. 30 
[Tables 5 About Here]
We …nd that the median ETC in a …rm's city-industry cell is strongly correlated with the …rm's own ETC: the instrumental variable is highly statistically signi…cant in the …rst stage regression, and we will present evidence later that it appears to be a strong instrument in the sense of Bound, Jager and Baker (1995). Moreover it is plausible that the instrument is not correlated with other …rm-speci…c performance shocks after controlling for provincial and industry dummies and other 3 0 These arguments are similar to those of Nevo (2001) , who argued that regional average prices (excluding the city being instrumented) can be used as an instrument for the city-level price because both prices respond to the product's common marginal cost. …rm characteristics. When we have ETC interacting with IN cj , the corresponding instruments are the city-industry median ETC IN cj . Table 5 reports the GMM results of the ETC e¤ect on …rm productivity. The table also reports the …rst stage F -statistics and Shea partial R 2 , and the statistics suggest that we have reasonably strong instruments. For instance, the …rst-stage F -statistics for our instrument is 37.5, far surpassing the commonly-required threshold for strong instruments of 10. Overall, the GMM results are similar to what we found earlier on with the OLS speci…cation. A noticeable di¤erence is that in speci…cation (2) of Table 5 , "Government Help" becomes positive and signi…cant, and "Tax Burden in the Previous year" becomes negative and signi…cant. Thus, the institutional environment variables have the expected e¤ects on …rm productivity. The GMM results also di¤er from the OLS results in that the magnitudes of the negative e¤ect of ETC have become larger. For the no-interaction speci…cation, the ETC e¤ect changes from around -5.0 in OLS to around -7.7 in GMM, which suggests that ETC is positively correlated with the unobservable determinants of …rm performance. However, the relative declines in magnitude when the institutional environment gets worse are similar: by -30% when "Tax Burden in the Previous Year"increases by one standard deviation, and by -40% when "Government Help" drops by 1 standard deviation.
Alternative Explanations and Further Results
Mismeasurement of Productivity? In this section we consider some alternative explanations for our results. One concern is that the relationship between productivity and ETC we found may be driven by our ways of estimating productivity. To address this concern, we use three alternative measures of productivity. The …rst is the …xed-e¤ect estimates of productivity, assuming CobbDouglas production function. Here the productivity is estimated individually for each two-digit industry, allowing for …rm …xed e¤ects and using the value-added-capital-labor framework. The second is again the …xed-e¤ect estimates of productivity, but allows more general functional form (the translog production function). The third is more primitive, simply labor productivity, as measured as logged value added per employee. For each measure of productivity, we present both the OLS and GMM results in Table 6 . For the OLS speci…cation, we again allow the disturbance terms among …rms to be correlated at the city level. For all three measures, the qualitative results are basically the same as in the previous section. Thus, our result of the negative relationship between ETC and productivity is robust to di¤erent measures of productivity.
[ Table 6 About Here] Do the ETC E¤ects Di¤er by Ownership? In the regressions reported in Tables 4 and   5 we controlled for a …rm's share of private ownership. However, one may think that a …rm's governance structure may depend mainly on who has the control rights of the …rm. We classify the sample …rms into two types, that of private …rms (those with the summation of domestic and foreign private ownership exceeding 50 percent), and state-owned …rms (those with state ownership exceeding 50 percent). We again present both OLS and GMM estimates for each of the two types of …rms in Table 7 . Clearly, for each of the two types, ETC has a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on productivity and the negative e¤ects are less pronounced in worse institutional environments. Comparing the marginal e¤ect of ETC on productivity between the two types of …rms, we …nd that state-owned …rms experience more negative e¤ects from ETC relative to private …rms. This suggests that managerial excesses may be more pronounced in state-owned …rms, because their CEOs tend to be less vigilantly monitored by owners than those of private …rms.
When "Government Help"decrease by one standard deviation, the negative e¤ect of ETC becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero for private …rms (GMM estimation). Thus in particularly unfriendly institutional environment, private …rms are able to use ETC e¤ectively to "smooth things out"and make things work for them. This again supports our hypothesis that a …rm's governance structure a¤ects the components of ETC.
[ Tables 7 About Here] Do ETC E¤ects Di¤er by Regions of Di¤erent Income Levels? From Table 2 , ETC is higher in low-income regions. In general, low-income regions tend to have worse institutional environments. Then our theory would suggest that low-income regions should see more e¤ective ETC investments in improving productivity (in a relative sense); in other words, the marginal e¤ect of ETC on productivity should be higher in lower-income regions than in higher-income regions.
To check this, we separate the sample into subsamples of …rms from high-and low-income cities, according to whether the city's real GDP per capita is above or below the median. The results are contained in Table 8 . Consistent with our theory, the negative e¤ects of ETC are much more pronounced in the rich subsample. In addition, when "Government Help"drops or "Tax Burden in the Previous Year" increases by one standard deviation (from the mean), the ETC e¤ect becomes statistically insigni…cant in low-income regions while does not change much in high-income regions.
Thus for low-income regions featuring particularly bad institutional environment, ETC can be quite productive investment in helping …rms obtain better government services and protect them from excessive government expropriation.
[ Tables 8 About Here voices may carry more weight. It is therefore plausible that they should be less worried about government services and expropriation. Small …rms, with less connections and bargaining power, should therefore be more sensitive to the institutional environment; their ETC investment on government o¢ cials should have higher relative jump in payo¤s when moving from a high-to lowinstitution location. Note that the average payo¤ to ETC may be higher for large …rms (relative to small …rms) due perhaps to the economy of scale in ETC investment. However, the relative increase in ETC payo¤ for low-institution relative to high-institution locations should be higher for small (relative to large) …rms. To check this di¤erence in the relative sensitivity of ETC return to institutions, Table 9 report the empirical results on ETC e¤ects on TFPLP for large and small …rms. Large (small) …rms are de…ned to be …rms above (below) the median in the number of employees in the previous year.
[ Tables 9 About Here] The results conform to our priors. For large …rms, the GMM results show that the marginal e¤ects of ETC, both evaluated at the mean and the points with the institutional variables one standard deviation away from the mean, are all statistically insigni…cant. Moreover, "Government Help"and "Tax Burden in the Previous Year"are either statistically insigni…cant, or only marginal signi…cant in directly a¤ecting TFPLP. In contrast, small …rms witness a strong negative average ETC e¤ect, and the e¤ect is signi…cantly contained when institutions get worse: the average ETC e¤ects decline by slightly more than 40% when "Government Help"drops by one standard deviation, and by 30% when "Tax Burden in the Previous Year" increase by one standard deviation (see Column 4) . In addition, the direct e¤ects of both institutional variables on TFPLP are highly signi…cant with the right sign, again pointing toward strong e¤ects of institutions on small …rms.
Thus the returns to ETC are much more sensitive to local institutions for small (relative to large) …rms.
Non-Business-Related ETC Another concern is that since ETC has been shown to be a mixture of normal business expenditure (including implicit CEO pay), managerial excesses, and bribes for the government, it may make sense to simply focus on the non-business-related ETC to see how it a¤ects …rm performance. To see if our qualitative results are a¤ected by this concern, we …rst construct a non-business-related ETC ("NB-ETC"), which is the regression residual of ETC on several variables that can be plausibly classi…ed as business-related (including log of lagged employment, log of …rm age, the dummy variable for selling to other provinces, log of years of relationship with trading partners, and log of CEO pay). We then relate TFPLP to NB-ETC in the same way that we relate TFPLP to ETC before. The results are in Table 10 . The qualitative results regarding ETC e¤ects and its interaction with the institution environment variables are the same as what we found before.
[ Tables 10 About Here] Summary. To summarize, our analysis of the e¤ects of ETC on …rm performance provides strong support for our earlier …ndings about the composition of ETC. A signi…cant portion of ETC is bribes to government o¢ cials, both for protection against government expropriation and in exchange for better government service. Accordingly, in situations with more severe government expropriation and a lower quality of government service, ETC tends to be higher and have a higher marginal return to …rm performance. Managers also spend a portion of ETC on managerial excesses, as shown by the fact that ETC have a signi…cantly negative e¤ect on …rm performance. These results are fairly robust to various functional forms and control variables and instrumenting ETC with its local norm.
We also obtain the same results when productivity is measured in di¤erent ways. In addition, we …nd evidence that the negative e¤ects of ETC are more pronounced in state-owned …rms than in private …rms, consistent with more managerial excesses in state-owned …rms. Moreover, poor regions in China feature worse institutional environments and higher private returns to ETC. Finally, the private return of ETC for small …rms are more sensitive to their local institutions.
Conclusion
We use large unique …rm-level data sets from China to analyze the determinants and e¤ects of Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese …rms, a standard expenditure item in the accounting book of Chinese …rms. We rely on the predictions from a simple model of managerial decisionmaking to identify components of ETC by examining how the total ETC responds to di¤erent institutional environment variables. In our empirical analysis we …nd strong evidence that …rms' ETC consists of a mix that includes expenditures on government o¢ cials both as "grease money"
and "protection money,"implicit CEO pay, and managerial excesses. ETC overall has a signi…cantly negative e¤ect on …rm productivity, but its negative e¤ect is much less pronounced for those …rms located in cities with low quality government services, those subject to severe government expropriation and those that are located in poor regions.
Our paper echoes the message of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) in demonstrating that corruption is a¤ected by various institutional factors; as a result, a negative overall correlation between corruption and …rm performance does not necessarily indicate that all corruption components worsen …rm performance. It is important to point out, however, while we …nd that parts of ETC expenditures have positive impact on …rm performance, it does not necessarily imply that, these components of ETC expenditures are socially "e¢ cient grease." Our …nding implies that in economies with weak institutions …rms may …nd it individually rational to pay bribes and government o¢ cials …nd it individually rational to accept bribes. However, to evaluate the social e¢ ciency of bribes, we have to take into account the possibility that bribing and government institutions are determined jointly in equilibrium. If, for example, government o¢ cials were intentionally lowering their service quality to extort more bribes, then banning corruption in the whole economy can improve the quality of government service. 
Marginal Effects:
At the mean "government help" -6.432*** -6.267*** and "tax burden" (0.653) (0.652) Increase "tax burden" by 1 SD -5.032*** -5.040*** (0.670) (0.677) Decrease "government help" by 1 SD -4.348*** -4.113*** (0.828) (0.812) Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors clustered at the city level. : * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. OLS robust standard errors clustered at the city level. There are three first-stage F-statistics and Shea partial R 2 in Column (2) for the three endogenous variables included in the specification respectively. (1.922) Notes. NB-ETC is the residual from the regression of ETC on log(lagged employment), log(firm age), 1(sell to other province), log(years having known the important trading partners), and ln(CEO compensation). Robust standard errors clustered at the city level. The first-stage F statistics are similar to what we found earlier, and are not reported. 
